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FORM VERSUS SUBSTANCE: A
COMPARISON OF BRAZIL'S TAX SYSTEM
TO THE TAX SYSTEM OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ROBERTO GRECO DE SOUZA FERREIRA'

I.

INTRODUCTION

When faced with numerous lawful alternatives to reach the
same desired result, individuals and legal entities most likely will
choose the one for which they will incur the least income tax liability, regardless of their culture or education. This is known as tax
planning. It considers the tax implications of business decisions,
usually with the goal of minimizing tax liability. Reducing tax liability is more realistic in a global and capitalist world where
money is essential to successfully carry on any business.
In any country, tax planning strategies encounter boundaries
that are sometimes extremely difficult to draw. For instance,
there is a gray area between tax avoidance, which is a legal tax
saving, and tax exasion, which is illegal. Regarding tax avoidance, it is impossible to assure that this kind of a procedure will
always be acceptable by the government within the taxpayer's
country. Furthermore, if a transaction is considered to be part of
a tax avoidance plan, there is a chance that it will not be considered for income tax purposes and instead, the government will
successfully recast it, looking beyond the form of the transaction
to reach the true intention of the taxpayer. This is known as the
substance-over-form doctrine.
This paper will focus on making a comparative analysis2
1. Roberto Greco de Souza Ferreira is an associate with Stroeter, Royster & Ohno
Advogados, associated with Steel Hector & Davis LLP. He received his LL.M. degree
in taxation from Georgetown University Law Center and his law degree from
Pontificia Universidade Cat6lica de Sao Paulo - PUC-SP (Brazil). He also received a
specialization degree in taxation from Pontificia Universidade Cat6lica de Sao Paulo PUC-SP (Brazil). He is a member of the Brazilian Bar Association, the Brazilian
Association of Fiscal Law and the International Fiscal Association. Unless otherwise
indicated, the author provided all translations herein.
2. It is important to note that: "[clomparative study is, however, notoriously
difficult. Full understanding of a foreign tax system may require mastery not only of
a foreign language, but also of foreign business and legal cultures. It would be the
work of a lifetime for a single individual to achieve that level of understanding of the
nine income taxes compared in this volume." ALviN C. WARREN, JR., Preface to HUGE
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between the substance-over-form doctrines of Brazil and of the
United States of America, addressing several legal issues involving the so-called "tax avoidance" plan. In the United States, the
substance-over-form doctrine was developed as a result of many
years of Supreme Court case law and precedent,3 while this same
doctrine was adopted in Brazil by the enactment of Complementary Law No. 104 of January 10, 2001. 4
To address the legal issues involving the circumstances in
which both the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and
the Brazilian equivalent agency (Secretariada Receita Federal5 )
may invoke the substance-over-form doctrine for income tax purposes, it is essential to compare and contrast the legal traditions
of Brazil and the United States. Furthermore, it is worthwhile
briefing the tax system of each country, so that the situations in
which the substance-over-form doctrine comes into play may be
fully understood.
Part II discusses the significant differences between civil law
and common law traditions. The characteristics of the legal tradition developed within a country most likely will interfere with the
construction of the substance-over-form doctrine for tax purposes.
In this regard, while the Brazilian tax system is totally dependent
upon statutory law, the American tax system depends not only
upon statutory law, but also upon case law.
Part III focuses on the structure of the tax system of both
countries since the applicability of the substance-over-form doctrine is strictly related not only to the legal tradition of each country but, as a consequence of the elected legal tradition, to the
structure of the tax system. The Brazilian Constitution sets forth
tax rules that must be followed by all political entities. The most
important rule is the principle of legality, under which no one will
J. AULT, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYsIs vii (KIumer Law
International) (1997).
3. See United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921); Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465 (1935). In such cases, the Supreme Court put extreme weight on the
substance rather than the form used by the taxpayers. Several relevant Supreme
Court cases in which the substance-over-form doctrine came into play will be
discussed throughout this work.
4. Lei Complementar [Complementary Law] No. 104, de 10 de janeiro de 2001,
D.O.U. de 11.01.2001.
5. The Secretariada Receita Federal [Internal Revenue Service], created in 1968
(Decreto No. 63.659, de 20 de novembro de 1968, D.O.U. de 21.11.1968), is a federal
organ subordinated to the Finance Ministry. Its main purpose is to enforce, among
other federal taxes, the voluntary fulfillment of income tax obligations, taking audit,
collection, and assessment measures when appropriate.
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be forced to do or to refrain from doing anything unless by virtue
of statutory law.' Compared to the Brazilian tax system, the
American tax system is much more flexible. Because the U.S.
Constitution does not enumerate all taxes that may be imposed by
each level of the government, but rather imposes principles of taxation, the political entities have more freedom to enact statutory
laws levying taxes.
Part IV makes a distinction between tax evasion and tax
avoidance. This distinction is especially relevant to understand
the Brazilian substance-over-form doctrine. Part V focuses on the
development of the substance-over-form doctrine in both countries. Since this theory is very broad in the United States, some
transactions in which the application of the substance-over-form
doctrine has been confronted by courts are discussed in detail.
These include: transactions characterized as part gift and part
sale; related party transactions; transactions recast as like-kind
exchanges; and transactions dealing with entitlement to depreciation deductions. Likewise, this section will also address the position taken by Brazilian courts with respect to this doctrine.
Part VI concludes that Brazil and the United States have
adopted the substance-over-form doctrine to disregard the form of
certain transactions for tax purposes. Nonetheless, due to the differences between the legal traditions of both countries, the substance-over-form doctrine in the United States is much more
accepted by courts than the substance-over-form doctrine in Brazil. Moreover, while in the United States such a doctrine governs
a variety of situations in which the structure of a transaction is
made solely for tax avoidance purposes, the same principle is not
accepted in Brazil, where both courts and the government may
disregard the form of the transaction when there is evidence of tax
evasion.
II.
A.

CIVIL LAW VERSUS COMMON LAW

The Brazilian Civil Law Tradition

There are two categories of legal traditions around the world:
civil law and common law traditions.7 Civil law is codified law
6. Constitui Ao Federal [C.F.] [Brazilian Constitution] (1988) (Braz.). See
discussion infra p. 11 and note 26.
7. The majority of authorities understand that there are only two legal
traditions: civil law and common law. See CHARLES F. ABERNATHY, LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES CASES AND MATERIALS 18 (International Law Institute, 1995). Some
authorities, however, believe that, in addition to civil law and common law, a third
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("code-based law") because, as the name intuitively indicates, it is
based on codified statutes. Common law is case law ("case-based
law"), because it is based on prior judicial decisions that create a
body of law.' While Brazil is an example of a civil law country, the
United States is an example of a common law country. Moreover,
the Brazilian civil law tradition was extremely influenced by
Roman law, while the United States common law tradition was
influenced by the English system of common law.'
As in many civil law countries, Brazilian statutory law, or legislation, is systematically codified.1" Accordingly, the Brazilian
category of legal tradition exists. That is the socialist law.

See JOHN HENRY

MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF

WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 1 (Stanford University Press, 2d ed.1985).
8. See ABERNATHY, supra note 7. Although the differences between civil law and
common law will be further addressed in more detail, the author presents the
following helpful comparative summary related to such differences:
Code Law
Legislature creates law
Law changes as legislature changes
Courts find law scientifically
Law
Law
Law
Law

is
is
is
is

integrated in code
pervasive
collection of doctrines
known from written code

Security resides in certainty
Government makes law
The code speaks; no case precedent
Law professors know law best

Common Law
Courts create law
Law evolves over time
Experience and practicality, some logic,
guide courts
Law is diffuse, incomplete
Law is interstitial
Law is collection of results
Law is known internally by citizens, social
osmosis
Security may reside in uncertainty
Law reflects citizens' values
Case precedents disclose law
Professors affect law little

9. It should be pointed out that the sole purpose of this comparative analysis of
the differences between the Brazilian civil law and the United States common law
traditions is to correctly understand the differences of substance-over-form doctrines

developed by both countries. Therefore, there is no aim at making a comparison
concerning the historical achievement of both legal traditions. Nonetheless, for
historical development of civil law and common law traditions, including some
comparisons between both traditions, see F. H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT
THE CIVIL LAW (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Law School, 1953); Raul Lozano
Merino, Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Conference on Legal Aspects of Doing
Business in Latin America: New Approaches: Looking to the Twenty-First Century, 11
FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 50-6 (1996); MARY ANN GLENDON, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON &
CHRISTOPHER OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS, TEXT, MATERIALS AND CASES

(American Casebook Series, West Publishing Co., 2d ed., 1994).
10. Although there are a variety of codes in Brazil, the most important of these
codes are the following: CODIGO CIWL[C.C.], Lei No. 10.406, de 10 de janeiro de 2002,
D.O.U. de 11.01.2001. CODIGO COMERCIAL [C.Co.], Lei No. 556, de 25 de junho de
1850, C.L.BR 1850 v. 001. C6DIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.], Lei 5.869, de 11 de
janeiro de 1973, D.O.U. de 17.01.1973. CODIGO PENAL [C.P.], Decreto-lei No. 2.848, de
7 de dezembro de 1940, D.O.U. de 31.12.1940. C6DIGO DE PROCESSO PENAL [C.P.P.],
Decreto-lei No. 3.689, de 2 de outubro de 1941, D.O.U. de 13.10.1941. CODIGO
TR]BuTARio NACIONAL [C.T.N.], Lei No. 5.172, de 25 de outubro de 1966, D.O.U. de
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legal system absolutely depends upon statutory law, which, in
turn, constitutes the principal source of law." Nevertheless, when
statutory law is silent or obscure on a particular topic, Brazilian
courts have an essential role in resolving disputes by using other
sources of law including analogy, customs, and the general principles of law. 2 Customs and the general principles of law, however,
only may be used when analogy cannot. Therefore, there is a hierarchy for the use of these supplementary sources of law. Analogy
must be used first, customs second, and general principles of law
third. This principle is based on the fact that written law is
supreme in Brazil.
When Brazilian judges apply the principle of analogy to
resolve a conflict, they do not disregard the law. Instead, they use
the law applicable to similar cases and apply it to a concrete
case. 3 The principle of analogy is widely applicable to tax law
except when its application results in the assessment of a tax not
imposed by statutory law. 4 Furthermore, customs only are relevant as a supplementary source of law when they do not conflict
with statutory law. Moreover, in order to be used, customs must
be subject to continuous and widespread use. When Brazilian
judges are unable to apply either analogy or customs to resolve a
particular dispute due to the obscurity of the statutory law, they
may use the general principles of positive law to resolve it.'"
27.10.1966. CONSOLIDA(O AO DAS LEIS DO TRABALHO [C.L.T.], Decreto-lei No. 5.452, de
10 de malo de 1943, D.O.U. de 9.08.1943. C6DIGO ELEITORAL [C.E.l, Lei No. 4.737, de
15 de julho de 1965, D.O.U. de 19.07.1965.
11. See MIGUEL REALE, L1Q6ES PRELIMINARES DE DIREITO 163 (Saraiva 20' edivao)
(1993) (the author emphasizes the principle that statutory law represents the most
important source of Brazilian law).
12. See Decreto-lei (Decree-law] No. 4.657, de 4 de setembro de 1942, D.O.U. de
4.09.1942.Article 4 provides that: "[wihen legislation is silent, the judge shall decide
the case in accordance with analogy, customs and general principles of law". See also
C.P.C., Lei No. 5.869, de 11 de janeiro de 1973, D.O.U. de 17.01.1973. Article 126
provides that: "[tihe judge is not absolved from his duty to reach a decision on the
grounds that the law is silent or obscure. When giving judgment he must apply the
legal rules; where such do not exist, he must have recourse to analogy, to custom and
to the general principles of law".
13. See CARLOS ROBERTO GONQALVES, SINOPSES JURIDICAS: DIREITO CvitL PARTE
GERAL [Law Synopsis: Civil Law General Part] 22 (Saraiva 9' edipdo) (2002). The
author provides an overview of the principle of analogy and its applicability to the
Brazilian law.
14. C.T.N., Lei No. 5.172, de 25 de outubro de 1966, D.O.U. de 27.10.1966, art.
108, § 1' (stating that "in absence of express provision of the law, the authorities may
decide by analogy, but cannot use [such rationale] to impose a tax not established by
law").
15. See

PAULO

DouRADO

DE

GusMAO,

INTRODUQAO

A CI2NCIA

DO

DIREITO

[Introduction to Law Science] 72 (Revista Forense) (1973) (providing that: "[plositive
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In addition to analogy, customs, and the general principles of
law, Brazilian judges also may use treatises, legal periodicals, and
case law to resolve judicial disputes. Besides resolving disputes,
Brazilian case law's main purpose is to interpret legislation and
regulations to achieve a uniform understanding. Nonetheless,
Brazilian judges do not necessarily have to follow precedents emanating from higher courts. The doctrine of stare decisis does not
exist in the Brazilian legal system, but a decision emanating from
the Brazilian Supreme Court most likely will persuade lower
courts."6 Furthermore, as a general rule, the fundamental role of
Brazilian case law is to apply the existing statutory law to a concrete case. Judges are, however, faced with the responsibility of
interpreting the law. As pointed out by Antonio Chaves "[i]t is not
the specific function of the judges to interpret the law. But, in the
performance of their duties, they have to resolve the cases submitted to them, which they can only do by determining the scope of
the legislative rules in question." 7
B.

The United States Common Law Tradition

As in any other common law tradition, case law is traditionally the primary source for U.S. law, playing an essential role in
constructing a body of principles -'"body of laws.""8 Moreover,
American case law is governed by the doctrine of stare decisis.
Therefore, as a general rule, decisions emanating from higher
courts are binding on lower courts, an important difference from
the Brazilian legal standpoint.
It should be noted, however, that statutory law in the United
States is also a relevant source of law. In most situations, case
law is founded on certain principles which give unity to the system. They are the
principles which guide the legislator. It is to these principles that the legal
interpreter should have recourse in the first instance. In order to attain such
principles, the progressive comparison, generalization and abstraction of all positive
law in force in a country is essential").
16. The doctrine of stare decisis is defined in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th
ed. 1999) as follows: "[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a
court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in
litigation."
17. ANTONIO CHAVES, LIc0ES DE DIRETO CIVIL [Lessons of Civil Law) 134
(Bushatsky) (1972).
18. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). This Supreme Court case,
decided in the early nineteenth-century, illustrates common law tradition of
possession or occupancy as the basis of property ownership. The opinion, delivered by
Chief Justice John Marshall, ruled that the "doctrine of first possession," meaning a
definitive declaration of one's intent to appropriate the land, prevails as the theory of
property ownership.
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law significantly influences the interpretation and even the enactment of statutory law. Because of the great importance of case
law and statutory law, the American common law tradition is both
an adaptable statutory code and an instrument of lawmaking, or a
kind of hybrid system. As pointed out by one commentator:
Yet because American law is a mixture of code-based law
and common law, additional unique problems can arise.
Two are very important. First, statutes, as we shall see,
often use words, phrases, or concepts from the common law,
so that statutory law incorporates common law ideas.
Interpretation of the code, therefore, will often require
knowledge of the traditional, centuries-old common law.
Second, American judges continue to be influenced by the
common law's idea that consistency in the application of
law must be demonstrated in each decision. Therefore,
American judges will attempt to explain their decisions in
the context of prior judicial decisions, many of them quite
recently decided cases. These recent decisions, therefore,
also affect the court's judgment: they are not "centuries-old
common law," but they are nevertheless a part of the judgemade law that influences the court's ultimate decision. 19
C.

Differences between the Brazilian Civil Law and
the United States Common Law Traditions

The most important distinction between the Brazilian civil
law tradition and the American common law tradition is the different approach given to statutory law. In Brazil, statutory law is
the basis of tax law and, therefore, also the basis of the substanceover-form doctrine. The same principle cannot be applied in the
United States, however, where both case law and statutory law
are the basis of tax law. Moreover, while anti-avoidance rules
have developed from statutory law in Brazil, anti-avoidance rules
initially developed from case law in the United States.
One commentator explained this distinction:
The civil law tradition is based largely upon Roman law.
One of the basic differences between the civil and common
law traditions is the attitude toward legislation. Legislation is largely codified in the civil law tradition. While we
have codes in the common law, they are not the same kind
of codes. The codes in the United States, for example, are
less complete, less systematic, and less organic than those
19.

ABERNATHY,

supra note 7, at 4.
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found in civil law countries. A lawyer in a civil law country
tends to first look to the code to find the meaning of or solution to legal problems. In contrast, in a common law country, a lawyer tends to look first to cases. He also may look
to statutes, but he always looks to cases to figure out what
the statute means. Many times, the common law lawyer
will say, "There is a statute on the books, but I cannot tell
you what it means because the courts have not interpreted
it yet."2

III.

BRAZILIAN TAX SYSTEM VERSUS AMERICAN TAX SYSTEM

A.

Overview of the Brazilian Tax System

The Federal Constitution, as the supreme law of Brazilian
society, is the most important source of Brazilian tax law.21
Besides delineating the form and limitations of the three government branches (legislative, judiciary and executive) and securing
the rights of its citizens, the Brazilian Constitution establishes in
extensive detail what kind of taxes may be imposed by each level
of government of the federative system. Unlike the United States,
all rules (without exception) related to Brazil's tax system are set
forth in the Brazilian Constitution. Such unique character leads
to the conclusion that Brazil has an extremely rigid and centralized constitutional tax system.22 Accordingly, in Brazil, political
entities maintain tax jurisdiction only to the extent granted by the
Federal Constitution."
As a corollary to the strictness of the Brazilian constitutional
tax system, the Federal Constitution imposes a variety of limitations on the taxing power of the political entities. These limita20. Keith S. Rosenn, Proceedingsof the Ninth Annual Conference on Legal Aspects
of Doing Business in Latin America: New Approaches: Looking to the Twenty-First
Century, 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 70 (1996).
21. CF. art. 145-162 (Braz.).
22. See, e.g., RoQUE ANTONIO CARRAZ A, CURSO DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL
TmiuTAuRo [Course on Constitutional Tax Law] 287-296 (Malheiros, 1997)
addressesing this unique characteristic of the Brazilian tax law).
23. CF. art. 145 (Braz.) (stating that "[tihe Federal Government, the States, the
Federal District and the Municipalities may levy the following tributes: I - taxes; II fees, by virtue of the exercise of police power or for effective or potential use of specific
and divisible public services rendered to taxpayers or place at their disposition; III assessments for public works. § 1°:Whenever possible, taxes shall be personal and
shall vary with the economic capacity of the taxpayer. To make these objectives
effective, the tax administration may identify the patrimony, income and economic
activities of the taxpayer, respecting individual rights and the terms of the law. § 20:
Fees may not be calculated on the same basis as taxes").
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tions are "constitutional limitations on the power to tax."2 4 The

purpose of the existing constitutional limitations on taxing power
is to safeguard certain fundamental rights and guarantees of taxpayers, such as liberty, equality, security and property.
The most relevant constitutional limitation on the power to
tax, most likely resulting from the Brazilian civil law tradition, is
the legality principle ( nullum tributum sine lege), under which, as
a general rule, taxes may only be imposed pursuant to statutory
law.25 Therefore, the federal government, the states, the federal
district and the municipalities may only impose taxes, or even
increase or amend taxes, by means of statutory law." Moreover,
in the field of taxation, the legality principle does not permit
exceptions. This means that even for extraordinary cases, such as
the imposition of a tax for a public calamity or a tax for a foreign
war, the legality principle must be respected. If not respected, the
imposition of a tax not in accordance with the legality principle
will be unconstitutional.
As a consequence of the legality principle in tax law, the Brazilian Constitution also sets forth a variety of limitations on the
power to tax. Pursuant to the non-retroactivity principle, no tax
may be imposed when the taxable event occurred prior to the law's
taking effect. Furthermore, according to the anteriority principle
24. Fi.Avio BAUER NOVELLI, Notes on the Brazilian Tax System, in A PANORAMA OF
LAw 63 (North-South Center and Editora Esplanada Ltda., 1992) (defining
constitutional limitations on the power to tax as follows: "Isluch limitations consist of
prohibitions or restrictions - that is to say, in duties to abstain - which the Federal
Constitution itself sets up directly, in order to safeguard certain fundamental rights
[liberty, equality, security, property, etc]. Thus, the true meaning of these limitations
can only be properly determined by reference to the same fundamental rights whose
exercise they are designed to guarantee").
25. With respect to the importance of the legality principle in the Brazilian tax
system, see HUGO DE BRITO MAcHADo, CURSO DE DIREITo TRIBuTARIO [Course on Tax
Law] 34 (Malheiros 18a. edi&o) (2000); IvEs GANDRA DA SILVA MARTINS,
COMENTARIOS A CONSTITUIAO DE 1988 [COMMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 1988],
volume 3 99-100 (Saraiva) (1994).
26. C.F, art. 150, I (Braz.) (stating that: "Without prejudice to any other
guarantees ensured to the taxpayers, the Federal Government, the States, the
Federal District and the Municipalities are prohibited from: I - imposing or
increasing a tax without a law that does so").
27. Emphasizing the importance of the principle of legality in the Brazilian tax
law, Article 97 of the National Tax Code provides that: "Only a law shall: I - institute
or extinguish taxes; II - increase or decrease taxes (". ."); III - define the taxable
event for the main tax obligation (".... ."); IV - set the tax rate and its calculation basis
(... ."); V - establish penalties for acts or omissions contrary to its provisions or other
violations defined therein; VI - establish the conditions for excluding, suspending and
canceling tax credits or waiving or reducing penalties." C.T.N., Lei No. 5.172, de
outubro de 1966.
BRAZILIAN
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(ex post facto), no tax may be levied unless it is imposed by a law
8
that came into effect before the beginning of the fiscal year.
Although not applicable to income tax, it should be noted that the
Federal Constitution imposes some exceptions to the application
of the anteriority principle.
Taking these principles into consideration, the Brazilian Constitution allows the Federal Government to impose taxes on:
* importation of foreign products;
" exportation abroad of national or nationalized products;
* income and benefits of any nature;
" industrialized products;
" credit transactions, foreign exchange operations, insurance
or transactions relating to negotiable instruments or
securities;
" ownership of rural property;
" large fortunes;
" residual jurisdiction taxes;
* war;
* compulsory loans; and
* social contributions, contributions regarding intervention
in the economic domain and contributions in the interest of
professional or economic categories.
The states and the federal district are allowed to impose taxes on:
" transfers by death and donations of any property or rights;
" transactions relating to circulation of goods and the performance interstate and inter-municipal transportation
and communication services, even if the transactions and
performance begin abroad; and
* ownership of automotive vehicles. 1
Finally, the municipalities are allowed to levy taxes upon:
" urban land and buildings;
• any type of non-gratuitous inter vivos transfers of real property, whether natural or by physical accession, and any in
rem rights to real property, except for guarantees, as well
as the assignment of rights to its acquisition; and
• services of any nature, with the exception of interstate and
inter-municipal transportation and communication
28.
29.
30.
31.

C.F. art. 150, III (Braz.).
Id. arts. 150, § 1', and 195, § 60.
Id. arts. 148, 149, 153, and 154.
Id. art. 155.
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2

services.3
Even though the Brazilian tax system is inserted into the
Federal Constitution, another infra-constitutional statute, the
Brazilian National Tax Code is the second source of the Brazilian
tax system. The Brazilian National Tax Code has the force of a
complementary law, serving as an intermediate law between the
Federal Constitution and the statutory laws (ordinary laws)
enacted by each level of the government with the aim at imposing
taxes. Because it works as a complementary law, the National
Tax Code plays an important role in the Brazilian tax system.34
The main purpose of the National Tax Code is to dictate some general rules related to definitions of taxpayers and taxes, tax obligation, and tax administration. The National Tax Code must be
observed by all tax authorities within the country. Nonetheless,
due to extensive tax rules imposed by the Federal Constitution,
some commentators have argued that the Brazilian National Tax
Code has no relevant purpose.
Pursuant to the National Tax Code, the income taxable event
is defined as "the acquisition of legal or economic availability:
e of income, being the product of capital, labor or a combination of both; and
32. Id. art. 156.
33. C.T.N. [National Tax Code], Lei No. 5.172, de 25 de outubro de 1966, D.O.U. de
27.10.1966.
34. Article 146 of the Constitution states that: "A complementary law shall: I deal with conflicts of taxing power among the Federal Government, the States, the
Federal District and the Municipalities; II - regulate the constitutional limitations on
the taxing power; III - establish general rules for tax legislation, particularly as to: a)
the definition of taxes and their types, as well as, with respect to taxes specified in
this Constitution, the definition of the respective taxable events, basis for calculation
and taxpayers; b) tax liability, assessment, credit, limitations periods and laches; and
c) adequate tax treatment for the cooperative acts performed by cooperative entities."
See C.F. art. 146 (Braz.).
35. See, e.g.,CARRAzzA, supra note 22, at 494-96. But see, e.g., IVEs GANDRA DA
SILVA MARTINS,

INTERNATIONAL

BUREAU OF FIscAL

DOcUMENTATION,

MONETARY

INDEXATION IN BRAZIL 33-5 (1978) (stating that: "It is systematic law since it offers to
Brazil's taxation system the possibility of a mechanism capable of transmitting the
guidelines [general rules] from the Constitution [i.e., its structure], as well as
allowing, at second level of priority, settlement of conflicts that might possibly occur
between bodies of the Federation and also, at a third level, [regulation oil the
Constitutional limits on the power to tax [a rule duly explained in the text of the
Constitution]. Clearly, the general rules of tax law, which are impossible to elucidate
in the Constitution, take greater priority in being represented in a complementary
law. In other words, the establishment of general rules of tax law, by means of a
complementary law, represents a guarantee of taxpayers and the certainty that the
tax collection authorities, through their legislative bodies, will not embark upon
destabilizing legal adventures").
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* of gains of any nature, being increases in patrimony not
comprehended within the previous item.""
Furthermore, and more important to the analysis of the development of the substance-over-form doctrine in Brazil for income tax
purposes, the National Tax Code has been amended by the enactment of Complementary Law No. 104. This law authorizes the tax
authorities to disregard certain transactions structured by the
taxpayer in such a way as to conceal the occurrence of a taxable
event. 7
B.

Overview of the American Tax System

The starting point to examine the American tax system is the
Federal Constitution, also known as the "supreme law of the
land." In the United States, the power of each level of government
to levy taxes is explicitly or implicitly granted by the Federal Constitution. Unlike the Brazilian approach, all rules of the United
States tax system are not set forth in the Federal Constitution.
Moreover, although the Federal Constitution grants tax jurisdiction to the political entities, it does not enumerate what taxes may
be imposed by each level of government.
Pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, Congress has broad powers to assess taxes. It provides that
"[tihe Congress shall have Power to Lay and Collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay Debts and provide for the
Common Defense and General Welfare of the United States; but
all Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States."3 8 The Federal Constitution goes even further,
determining that Congress may "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into the Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department of Officer
39
thereof."
It is worth noting that the power of Congress to impose
36. See C.T.N. art. 43 (Braz). It should be noted that in accordance with the rules
granted by both the Constitution and the National Tax Code to the federal
government to impose income tax, many statutory laws (the so-called ordinary laws)
have been enacted by the Brazilian Congress over the years. These laws were
consolidated into the Income Tax Regulations approved by Federal Decree No. 3.000
of March 26, 1999 (Decreto No. 3.000, de 26 de marco de 1999, D.O.U. de 29.03.1999).
37. See Lei Complementar No. 104, de 10 de janeiro de 2001, D.O.U. de
11.01.2001.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
39. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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income tax also comes from Article I, Section 8 of the United
States Constitution.4 ° Nevertheless, the Sixteenth Amendment
also makes available extensive powers to Congress to impose federal income tax to the extent that Congress is not required to
apportion the income tax among the states.4 ' It should also be
noted, however, that the U.S. Constitution grants political entities
very broad power to collect taxes while imposing limits on the
equal propower to tax, the most relevant being the due process,
4
tection, uniformity, and the commerce clauses. 1
Despite the imposition of certain barriers on the power to tax,
the U.S. Constitution, especially in the federal taxation area,
rarely interferes with the liberty of Congress to exercise its proscribed taxation power. For example, in 1868, the United States
Supreme Court, addressing the federal government's broad power
to tax, pointed out that:
It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and
only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it
must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and
indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and
thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at
discretion."
Based on the tax jurisdiction granted by the Constitution, the
United States Congress has enacted statutory laws imposing the
federal income tax since 1913. The most significant income tax
40. See BoRis I. BirTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 1-6
(1988) (citing the Brushaber Supreme Court case which ruled that the power of
Congress to impose income tax derives from Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution rather than from the Sixteenth Amendment).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration"). Note that before
the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the United States
Supreme Court held in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895),
that the earlier version of the federal income tax was unconstitutional on the ground
of violating of Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution which
stated: "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the
Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken." Accordingly, after the
decision in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, the Sixteenth Amendment replaced
Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution, allowing the
imposition of a federal income tax without apportioning that tax among the states.
42. For an extensive analysis of the constitutional limitations on the power to tax,
see Thomas A. Jaconetty & Craig W. Callahan, Power to Tax, SLT IL-CLE 1 S-1
(2000); Karla W. Simon, Congress and Taxes: A Separation of Powers Analysis, 45 U.
MiAMI L. REV. 1005 (1991); Boris 1. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the Taxing
Power of the Federal Government, 41 TAX LAw. 3 (1987).

43. License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462, 471 (1868).
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reform occurred with the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of
1986. 44 Despite the earlier development of the substance-overform doctrine by the United States Supreme Court, Congress
adopted Section 7701(1) of the Internal Revenue Code in 1993.
Section 7701(1) authorizes the Secretary of the IRS to "prescribe
regulations recharacterizing any multiple party financing transaction as a transaction directly among any two or more of such
parties when the Secretary determines that such recharacterization is appropriate to present avoidance of any tax by this title."45
C. Differences between Brazilian and American Tax
Systems
In comparison, the Brazilian tax system is much more rigid
than the American tax system. Taking into account the principles
and rules set forth in the Constitution, the Brazilian Congress and
other levels of the government do not have broad power to impose
taxes. The United States Congress, on the other hand, has almost
unlimited power to impose taxes. Furthermore, while the Brazilian Constitution enumerates all taxes that may be imposed by
each level of the government, the United States Constitution does
not attempt to do so. Therefore, while the detailed allocation of
tax jurisdiction by the Brazilian Constitution prevents two levels
of government from imposing the same tax over the same act,
transaction or activity, the same phenomenon does not occur in
the United States tax system where, for example, both the federal
government and the states may impose state and federal income
taxes.
In the same view, although both constitutions subject tax
jurisdiction to constitutional limits, the limits imposed by the Brazilian Constitution are much more extensive and strict in comparison to the limits imposed by the United States Constitution. For
example, the non-retroactivity principle is absolute in Brazil. It is
explicitly set forth in the Brazilian Constitution.4" In the United
States, on the other hand, the non-retroactivity principle is not
absolute. In Welch v. Henry,47 the United States Supreme Court,
analyzing the extent to which the non-retroactivity principle
might be applied, ruled that "[iun each case it is necessary to consider the nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it is
44. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
45. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(1).
46. C.F. art. 150, III (Braz.).

47. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
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laid before it can be said that its retroactive application is so
harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation."4" Moreover, considering the foregoing approach, the United
States Supreme Court has admitted the application of any law
increasing the tax rate for the entire current taxable year in which
the law was passed, despite the law being passed later in the same
year.

49

Another relevant aspect for comparison purposes is the difference between the legal tradition of the two countries, mainly the
complete dependence of the Brazilian legal system upon statutory
law and upon the legality principle and the primary reliance of the
United States legal system on case law. Having examined some of
the differences of each tax system, we can now understand how
the substance-over-form doctrine has developed in both countries,
as well as the situations in which the unique characteristics of
each country most likely will interfere with the application of such
doctrine.
IV.

TAx AVOIDANCE VERSUS TAX EVASION

Although the main purpose of this paper is to compare the
substance-over-form doctrine, an anti-avoidance mechanism,
developed in Brazil and the United States, it also is very important to make a distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance,
as well as to analyze how Brazil and the United States have dealt
with such that distinction. Generally speaking, while tax avoidance is defined as "the act of taking advantage of legally available
tax-planning opportunities to minimize one's tax liability," tax
evasion is "the willful attempt to defeat or circumvent the tax law
in order to illegally reduce one's tax liability.""0 In other words,
while tax avoidance is a legal way of saving taxes, tax evasion is
illegal.
Regardless of the differences between the Brazilian and the
American legal traditions, as well as the particularities of the
structure of each tax system, both countries have the same attitude regarding tax evasion. The same cannot be said with respect
to tax avoidance. Because Brazil and the United States have different legal systems, the most relevant difference being the char48. Id. at 147.
49. See United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937); United States v.
Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981). See also BrITrKER, supra note 40, at 1-10 and 1-11.
50. BLAciKs LAW DICTIONARY 1473-74 (7th ed. 1999).
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acteristic of their legal system traditions, tax avoidance is treated
differently in each country.

A.

Tax Evasion in the United States of America

In the United States, tax evasion, which is fraudulent, is punishable in both civil and criminal contexts. 5 While the civil sanctions include payment of the tax plus fines, which are determined
by tax authorities, criminal sanctions consist of penal charges
imposed through a criminal process. Moreover, "[ulnlike the civil
penalty, which usually applies only to the taxpayer himself, the
criminal provisions punish anyone engaging in the defined
offense, thus permitting the government to prosecute persons aiding a corrupt taxpayer. "52 Generally speaking, an attempt to
defeat or evade tax involves some fraudulent act, such as recording transactions with nonexistent people or entities, not recording
sales, operating bank accounts in false names, and so forth."3

B.

Tax Evasion in Brazil

In Brazil, tax evasion is defined as any fraudulent or simulated actions taken by taxpayers with the aim at evading, reducing, or delaying the payment of tax. 4 In this regard, any
taxpayer's conduct with the purpose of hiding an act that is foreseen as a tax event certainly will be considered an illegal behavior
and, therefore, punishable in both criminal and civil areas.55
Fraud is defined as any malicious action or omission with the
aim of obstructing or delaying, totally or partially, the occurrence
of a tax event, excluding or modifying its essential characteristics
51. See I.R.C. § 6672 (1994) (imposing a penalty equal to the total amount of the
tax evaded). See also I.R.C. § 7201 (1994) (imposing, upon conviction, a fine of not
more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisonment of not
more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution).
52. BITTKER, supra note 40, at 45-24, 25 (emphasis in original).
53. See Spies v. United States 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943) (ruling that "conduct such
as keeping a double set of books, making false entries or alterations, or false invoices
or documents, destruction of books or records, concealment of assets or covering up
sources of income, handling of one's affairs to avoid making the records usual in
transactions of the kind" constitute act of tax evasion).
54. See, e.g., ANTONIO ROBERTO SAMpAio DORIA, ELISAO E EvAsAO FIscAL [Tax
Evasion and Tax Avoidance) 21 (Jos6 Bushatsky ed., 1977) (differentiating tax
evasion from tax avoidance).
55. See Lei No. 9.430, de 27 de dezembro de 1996, D.O.U. de 30.12.96, art. 44, II
(imposing a penalty equivalent to 150% of the total amount of the tax evaded). See
also Lei No. 8.137, de 27 de dezembro de 1990, D.O.U. de 28.12.90 (imposing criminal
charges, including imprisonment of not more than five years, on the taxpayer who
uses any illegal device for reducing his tax liability).
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in order to reduce the amount of the due tax, or avoiding or postponing it.6 A typical example of tax fraud occurs when a taxpayer
records facts that are not true for the sole purpose of not paying
taxes .",

The definition of simulation is not found in any Brazilian tax
statutes," but rather in the Brazilian Civil Code, emphasizing
that simulation occurs (i) whenever the legal acts appear to confer
or transfer rights to persons other than those to whom the rights
are actually conferred or transferred; (ii) whenever the legal acts
contain an untruthful declaration, confession, condition or clause;
and (iii) whenever the particular instruments are pre or postdated.59 Simulation occurs when there is no connection between
the transaction that the parties really intend to accomplish and
the transaction that in fact is accomplished. For example, instead
of structuring a purchase agreement, the parties structure (simulate) a0 donation agreement, hiding the payment of the purchase
6
price.
Although fraud and simulation are two types of tax evasion,
there is a clear distinction between the two. In the case of fraud,
the illegality is totally evident. Whereas in the case of simulation,
the acts are apparently legal due to the malicious devices used by
the taxpayer that hide the real or true act. 1
C.

Tax Avoidance in the United States of America

In the United States, in principle, the taxpayer has the right
to arrange his affairs to pay less tax.6 2 Nonetheless, this right is
56. Lei No. 4.502, de 30 de novembro de 1964, D.O.U. de 30.11.1964, art. 72.
57. See Luciano da Silva Amaro, Planejamento Tributdrio [Tax Planning] 52
(Revista Dialdtica de Direito Tributdrio 71,2001) (citing examples of tax evasion
behaviors).
58. Different from the United States tax law prospective, the Brazilian tax law
cannot change the definition of terms derived from the civil law. Such principle is set
forth in Article 110 of the National Tax Code.
59. Lei No. 10.406, de 10 de janeiro de 2002, D.O.U. de 11.01.2001, art. 167, § 1'.
60. Amaro, supra note 57, at 53.
61. DO6RI, supra note 54, at 42.
62. See Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, L.,
dissenting) (stating that: "Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing
sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody
does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more
than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To
demand more in the name of morals is mere cant"); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465, 469 (1935) (explaining that "[tihe legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the
amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means
which the law permits, cannot be doubted").
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not absolute. 63 In this sense, one commentator has pointed out
that:
If the right was based on a source more profound than a
mere statute, modifying it might be more troublesome. We
would not want to limit fundamental rights or values. But.
the right cannot be found in any such source. For example,
there is no right to engage in tax planning in the Constitution or any other foundational documents of our society.
And the right to alter behavior to minimize taxes is not a
basic principle of moral philosophy. Tax planning does not,
for example, rank with the freedom of thought, speech,
association, religion, or other principles supported by moral
philosophers.
To summarize, no moral or philosophical basis for the right
to tax plan has yet been articulated. There is no constitutional right. There is not even an explicit statutory right.
There is, in short, no basis for a right to tax plan other than
statements made up out of thin air by a few judges using
questionable theories of statutory interpretation. Congress
can limit or expand the scope of the right to tax plan with
the stroke of a pen. If it is desirable to restrict tax planning, it should be restricted notwithstanding that doing so
would reduce the scope of allowable planning permitted
under current law.6
Moreover, even though the taxpayer may take advantage of a
legal mechanism to minimize his income tax burden, depending
on the characteristic and motive of the transaction chosen by him
to avoid income tax, the substance-over-form doctrine may come
into play to ignore the form of the transaction, reaching its genuine substance. Therefore, although tax avoidance is legal, it will
not be permitted in some circumstances, such as when the principal or sole purpose of the transaction entered by the taxpayer is to
minimize tax liability.65
63. See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469 (stating that "the question for determination is
whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute
intended"); Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Mill Co., 417 U.S. 134,
149 (1974) (recognizing that "while a taxpayer is free to organize his affairs as he
chooses, nevertheless, once having done so, he must accept the tax consequences of
his choice, whether contemplated or not ... and may not enjoy the benefit of some
other route he might have chosen to follow but did not") (internal citations omitted).
64. David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAx L. REV. 215, 221-22
(2002).
65. See Walter J. Blum, How the Courts, Congress and the IRS Try to Limit Legal
Tax Avoidance, 10 J. TAX'N 300, 301 (1959) (advising that: "[t]he taxpayer is to lose if
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Tax Avoidance in Brazil

In Brazil, the situation in which the taxpayer has the right of
arranging his affairs to pay less tax, except in the case of fraud or
simulation, has been widely accepted by commentators. 6 Every
Brazilian tax planning arrangement relies on the importance of
the principle of legality that prevents the tax authorities from
imposing tax on activities that do not correspond to any taxable
events set forth in the statutory tax law. Accordingly, pursuant to
the principle of legality, any taxpayer is allowed to take all necessary steps permitted by law to reduce his tax liability provided
that the taxable event has not yet occurred.
Unlike the United States tax system, the Brazilian system,
which is strongly based on the principle of legality, allows the taxpayer to enter into a transaction with the sole aim at reducing his
tax burden. Therefore, under Brazilian law, the government cannot disregard a transaction (duly permitted by law) simply
because the taxpayer structured the transaction for tax avoidance
purposes.
In addition, as a corollary to the principle of legality, the Brazilian Civil Code states that any legal act to be validly performed
requires a licit and possible subject matter, competent parties,
and, more importantly, a form determined or not forbidden by
law. 7 Having chosen a form that is not forbidden by law to structure his transaction, the taxpayer cannot, in any circumstance, be
compelled to pay more taxes because the tax authorities believe
that the form chosen by the taxpayer should be ignored. In this
regard, the Brazilian Constitution, stating that "the law shall not
injure the vested right, the perfect juridical act and the res judicata" s protects legal acts.
It should be noted that, besides the substance-over-form doctrine, many theories that restrict tax avoidance, such as abuse of
law and economic interpretation of law (business purpose), are
likely incompatible with the Brazilian tax system because it is primarily based on the principle of legality. This is so even though
tax avoidance is found to be a principal purpose, or he is to lose only if it is found to be
the principal purpose, or only if it is found to be a major purpose").
66. See RUTNAA NAVARRO GUERREIRO, Planejamento Tributdrio: os Limites de
Licitude e de Ilicitude [Tax Planning: Limits between Legal and Illegal], in
PLANEJAMENTO FIscAL - TEORIA E PRATICA [TAx PLANNING - THEORY AND PRACTICE],
181 Dialdtica 2 (1998); Ives Gandra da Silva Martins & Paulo Lucena de Menezes,
Elisdo Fiscal, [Tax Avoidance] 159 Revista Dialdtica de Direito Tributdrio 63 (2000).
67. Lei No. 10.406, de 10 de janeiro de 2002, D.O.U. de 11.01.2001, art. 167, § 10.
68. C.F. art. 5, XXXVI (Braz.).
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the same theories are applicable in many countries, including in
the United States. 9
V.

THE SUBSTANCE-OVER-FORM DOCTRINE

The substance-over-form doctrine in the United
States: The case law
The substance-over-form doctrine in which, as a general rule,
the taxpayer relies on the form of the transaction and the government relies on the substance of the transaction, essentially has
developed from court decisions in the United States.7" As such,
the substance-over-form is viewed as a case law doctrine, instead
of a statutory law doctrine. Many commentators have suggested
that the substance-over-form doctrine originated in 1935 when the
United States Supreme Court decided in Gregory v. Helvering that
the tax implications of certain transactions are strictly dependent
upon their substance rather than on the mere form chosen by the
taxpayer.7'
In Gregory v. Helvering, the taxpayer, Mrs. Gregory, owned
all of the shares of United Mortgage Corporation ("United"),
which, in turn, owned 1,000 shares of Monitor Securities CorporaA.

69. The majority of Brazilian commentators have argued that abuse of law and the
economic interpretation of law (business purpose) cannot be acceptable to the
Brazilian legal system, mainly due to the principle of legality, which, in turn,
prohibits the use of analogy for imposing a tax not established by law. That is to say,
a transaction will only be disrespected for tax purposes when it is structured by
means of fraudulent or simulated behaviors. See LucLANo DA SILVA AMARo, DIREITO
TRIBUTARIo BRASILEIRO [Brazilian Tax Law] 217-22 (Saraiva 8' edigao) (2002); Sacha
Calmon Navarro Coblho, Os Limites Atuais do Planejamento Tributdrio [Current
Limits to Tax Planning], in 0 PLANEJAMENTo TRIBUTARIO E A LEI COMPLEMENTAR 104,
[Tax Planning and Complementary Law 104] 301-02 (Dialdtica) (2001) (analyzing the
application of the business purpose doctrine to the Brazilian tax system, concluding
that such doctrine is only applicable to common law traditions and not to the
Brazilian civil law tradition that is totally dependent upon the principle of legality);
ALBERTO

XAVIER,

TIPICIDADE

DA

TRIBUTA(AO,

SImUiUAI(o

E NORMA ANTIELISIVA

[TAXATION, SIMULATION AND TAx AVOIDANCE LAw], 107 (Dialdtica) (2001). But see

AMILCAR DE ARAtio FALCAO, INTRODUQAO AO DIREITO TRIBUTAsIO [Introduction to Tax
FISCAL E
(Forense) (1997); MARCO AURALIO GRECO, PLANEJAMENTO
Law]
INTERPRETA(AO DA LEI TRIBUTARIA [TAX PLANNING AND INTERPRETATION OF TAX LAw],

71-86 (Dialdtica) (1998).
70. Although the taxpayer will most likely rely on the form of the transaction, in a
few cases the taxpayer also relies on its substance. See Helvering v. Lazarus, 308
U.S. 252 (1939).
71. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, The
Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters: Discussion, Analysis and Legislative Proposals 47
(1999) (explaining that the substance-over-form doctrine originated in Gregory v.
Helvering); Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 859, 866 (1982).
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tion ("Monitor"). The purpose of the transaction structured by the
taxpayer was to bail-out the Monitor shares as capital gain,
instead of dividend distribution. To achieve this result, a new corporation, Averill Corporation ("Averill"), was created by the taxpayer who transferred the Monitor shares in exchange for shares
of Averill. Subsequently, United distributed Averill's stock to the
taxpayer in a transaction that, pursuant to the law in force at that
time, was qualified as a tax-free corporate reorganization. Immediately thereafter, Averill was liquidated by distributing the Monitor shares to the taxpayer who sold such shares recognizing longterm capital gain on the sale.
The United States Supreme Court held that a tax-free reorganization did not occur and disregarded the form of the transaction on the ground that "[t]he whole undertaking... was in fact
an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a
corporate reorganization, and nothing else."72 Although this case
was not an authentic application of the substance-over-form doctrine, since the court also placed great weight on the lack of business purpose for the taxpayer structuring the transaction in the
way it was structured, it is worth noting that the Court has suggested that the substance-over-form doctrine most likely will come
into play when form does not reflect its substance.
It should also be noted that, prior to Gregory v. Helvering, the
United States Supreme Court had already articulated the importance of the substance-over-form doctrine, stating that: "[wie recognize the importance of regarding matters of substance and
disregarding forms in applying the provisions of the Sixteenth
Amendment and income tax laws enacted thereunder. In a number of cases besides those just cited we have under varying conditions followed the rule."73
The substance-over-form doctrine is one of the most complex
and controversial subjects of United States corporate tax law. 4
72. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 470.
73. United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168 (1921).
74. See Marvin A. Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax
Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440 (1968) (suggesting that the substance-over-form doctrine
is extremely complex because "[tihe courts themselves follow no single and consistent
set of rules in deciding when to accept and when to disregard the taxpayer's choice of
form, although there is a conclusory commonplace for either type of determination");
Saul Levmore, Recharacterizationsand the Nature of Theory in Corporate Tax Law,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 1019 (1988) (stating that "[a] source of continuing controversy and
mystery in corporate tax law is the acceptability of certain recharacterizations of
taxpayer transactions and the unsuitability of others in the eyes of both the courts
and the Internal Revenue Service . . . Although it is generally understood that
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The first reason for this controversy is that courts have developed
a principle in which form prevails sometimes, but not always.
Accordingly, it is troublesome to assure when the substance-overform doctrine will be successfully applied to a specified transaction.7" There is no universal set of principles that can be applied
to decide all tax disputes involving substance-over-form issues.
Second, since in most circumstances the substance-over-form doctrine is invoked together with other judicial doctrines of income
taxation, such as the business purpose and step transaction doctrines, it makes the analysis and reach of the substance-over-form
doctrine difficult. 7' Generally speaking, while the substance-overform doctrine disregards the form of a transaction, the step transaction doctrine combines a series of transactions into a single
transaction. Furthermore, under the business purpose doctrine,
all transactions will only be respected for tax purposes, if it was
not designed exclusively for tax avoidance purposes.
Assuming that the taxpayer may elect one of several forms
that have the same economic consequence to structure his transaction, when the substance-over-form doctrine comes into play,
and the government ignores the form chosen by the taxpayer, the
transaction will be taxed as the most costly of the possible.77 In
taxpayers may be held to the form in which they cast a transaction if this form is
agreeable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, little is known about those types
of forms that taxpayers may employ successfully to escape various taxes or the extent
of the Commissioner's power to recharacterize various taxpayer maneuvers"); Lewis
R. Steinberg, Form, Substance and Directionality in Subchapter C, 52 TAx LAW. 457
(1999) (understanding the complexity of the subject suggesting the following: "[i]n
teaching law students and young tax associates, I often point out that there are two
fundamental principles in Subchapter C of the Code: 'Substance controls, form does
not' and 'form controls, substance does not. This intentionally paradoxical
formulation is intended to convey one of the great challenges of practicing in the
corporate tax area (or, for that matter, in most areas of the federal income tax law):
when will the transactional form selected by the parties control the tax consequences
to them?").
75. See Blum, supra note 65, at 300. The author has suggested that: "If the courts
were to hold the view that form always must prevail (unless the legislature has
specified otherwise), tax dodging would be too easy, the public would soon become
disturbed, and the voluntary compliance foundation of our system would be
weakened. If the courts were to take the extreme opposite view that form need never
prevail (unless explicitly provided by statute), tax law would become too uncertain,
and the resulting chaos would materially impede business and financial operations."
76. BIrKER, supra note 40, at 1-28. The authors have stated that: "A related
source of difficulty is the common judicial practice of citing the substance-over-form
doctrine in combination with other broad concepts (e.g., the business purpose and step
transaction doctrines and the requirement of an accurate accounting method), thus
obscuring the independent force of each of these grounds of decision."
77. BORIS I. BITTER & LAWRENCE LORKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
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this regard, the substance-over-form doctrine is explained by the
following statement: "two transactions that achieve the same
underlying result should not be taxed differently simply because
they are achieved through different legal steps." '
For purposes of illustrating of this rationale, in Minnesota
Tea Co. v. Helvering,a case where cash was received by the corporate taxpayer and later distributed to its shareholders for the prearranged purpose that the shareholders would use the cash to discharge corporate debts, the United States Supreme Court held
that cash was not distributed to the shareholders, but rather taxable to the taxpayer. The Supreme Court reasoned that:
The conclusion is inescapable, as the court below very
clearly pointed out, that by this roundabout process petitioner received the same benefit 'as though it had retained
that amount from distribution and applied it to the payment of such indebtedness.' Payment of indebtedness, and
not distribution of dividends, was, from the beginning, the
aim of the understanding with the stockholders and was
the end accomplished by carrying that understanding into
effect. A given result at the end of a straight path is not
made a different result because reached by following a devious path.79
It should be noted, however, that in many circumstances, the
form chosen by the taxpayer should prevail. Such is the case
when form clearly reflects the substance of the transaction."
Another example occurs when "the substance of a transaction is
ambiguous or capable of being achieved through more than one
transactional approach, form frequently becomes the dispositive
factor in determining the tax treatment of the parties."" Moreover, there are many situations in which form is essential to control
the tax consequences of certain transactions. As pointed out by
some commentators:
For example, numerous accounting elections drastically
affect tax liabilities without altering taxpayers' relations
ESTATES AND
& LOKKEN].

GiFTs, Cumulative Supplement No. 2 S4-10 (2002) [hereinafter

BIrrKER

78. Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., Study of Present-Law
Penalty and Interest Provisions as Required by Section 3801 of the Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, at 190.
79. Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938).
80. See BITTKER, supra note 40, at 1-29.
81. Lewis R. Steinberg, Form, Substance and Directionality in Subchapter C, 52
TAx LAw. 457, 459 (1999) (analyzing several hypothetical examples in which form
plays an essential role in controlling the tax implications of a specified transaction).

334

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

with the outside world. A taxpayer's right to report income
using the cash method rather than the accrual method, to
elect accelerated depreciation rather than straight line
depreciation, and to use a fiscal or calendar year is not in
any way impaired by the fact that these are matters of form
rather than substance. Similarly, a taxpayer with several
blocks of the same company, purchased at different times
at different prices, can sell either high-cost or low-cost
shares merely by designating which shares are intended to
be sold, even though the designation has non-tax
ramifications. 2
In summary, although the successful invocation of the substance-over-form doctrine depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, many factors must be taken into
consideration by courts when ignoring the form of a transaction
for tax purposes. Such factors include, among others, existence of
tax avoidance motivation (tax planning purpose), reflection of economic reality or business purpose, and presence arm's length
conduct.83
Having given a general overview of the development of the
substance-over-form doctrine in the United States, the next step is
to examine those transactions that have been challenged by the
government on the ground of substance-over-form doctrine:
related party transactions, transactions characterized as part gift
and part sale, transactions recast as like-kind exchanges, and
transactions involving "who" is entitled to take depreciation
deductions."
(i)

Related Party Transactions

The substance-over-form doctrine most often comes into play
when transactions are entered into between related parties since,
in many circumstances, the form of the transactions are manipulated to take advantage of tax benefits. Not surprisingly, transac82. See BITKER & LOKKEN , supra note 77, at S4-3, 4-4.
83. See Steinberg, supra note 81, at 476-77.
84. Although this paper focuses on the application of the substance-over-form
doctrine to related party transactions, transactions characterized as part gift and part
sale, transactions re-characterized as like-kind exchanges, and situations in
concerning entitlement to deductions, there are many other circumstances in which
this doctrine may come into play, such as shareholders as conduits for the sale of
corporate assets, and deductibility of interest, among others. For example, see
Commissioner v. Court Holdings Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); John Kelley Co. v.
Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946); United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co.,
338 U.S. 451 (1958); Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
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tions between related parties are often structured as a mere
device to avoid taxes. As suggested by Boris I. Bittker and Lawrence Lokken "[t]he substance-over-form doctrine is invoked by
the government with greatest success with respect to transactions
between related persons, since in these circumstances form often
has minimal, if any, nontax consequences and particular forms
are often chosen solely to reduce taxes." 5
In this regard, the United States Supreme Court has scrutinized transactions entered into between related parties, applying,
when appropriate, the substance-over-form doctrine. For example, in the 1940 case of Higgins v. Smith,8 the taxpayer
attempted to deduct a loss on the sale of securities to a corporation, Innisfail Corporation, wholly owned by the taxpayer. The
Court denied the deduction of such loss on the ground that no sale
in substance had occurred. The Supreme Court pointed out that:
There was sufficient evidence of the taxpayer's continued
domination and control of the securities, through stock
ownership in the Innisfail Corporation, to support this verdict, even though ownership in the securities had passed to
the corporation in which the taxpayer was the sole stockholder. Indeed this domination and control is so obvious in
a wholly owned corporation as to require a peremptory
instruction that no loss in the statutory sense could occur
upon a sale by a taxpayer to such an entity.
Another Supreme Court case clearly reflecting the interference of the substance-over-form doctrine to indirect sales between
8
related parties is McWilliams v. Commissioner."
In this case, the
husband and wife taxpayers entered into transactions with the
sole aim at establishing tax losses. One spouse used the stock
exchange to sell shares to an unrelated purchaser, while at the
same time, the other spouse used the stock exchange to purchase
the same amount of shares from an unrelated seller. Filing separate tax returns, the taxpayers claimed deduction of the losses
incurred on the sale of stocks, but the government disallowed the
deduction. The Supreme Court understood that the sale of stock
to third parties was bona fide. Nonetheless the Court held that in
substance each transaction was an indirect sale between family
members and denied deductibility of the tax losses. The Court
85.
86.
87.
88.

See BrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 77, at S4-7.
Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
Id. at 475-76.
McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947).
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also noted that "[s]ecurities transactions have been the most common vehicle for the creation of intra-family losses." 9
It should be borne in mind that in many situations certain
transactions are not what they are purported to be. As a consequence, these transactions are recast not only by the government
but also, more importantly, by courts.
(ii)

Transactions Re-characterized as Like-Kind
Exchanges

In Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, the taxpayer sold
used trucks to G.M.C. for cash and simultaneously bought new
trucks from G.M.C. for cash." These transactions were totally
interdependent, meaning the first transaction would not have
occurred without the second. Instead of reducing the price paid
for the new trucks through a commercial discount, G.M.C. paid an
excessive amount for the old trucks. The taxpayer structured the
transactions with the sole purpose of creating tax advantages by
recognizing capital gain on the sale of the used trucks and taking
a larger depreciation deduction on the purchase of the new trucks.
The court held that this kind of transaction structured by the taxpayer could not be treated as a sale for tax purposes. Instead, the
transaction should be recast as a like-kind exchange." Relying on
the substance-over-form doctrine, the court held that "[elqually
well established is the corollary that an integrated transaction
may not be separated into its components for the purposes of taxation by either the Internal Revenue Service of the taxpayer."92
The court also suggested that tax avoidance is a right of the
taxpayer, but tax avoidance not reflecting business purposes
should not prevail. According to the court:
Taxation is transactional and not cuneiform. Our tax laws
are not so supple that scraps of paper, regardless of their
calligraphy, can transmute trade-ins into sales. Although
Redwing's transfers may have been paper sales, they were
actual exchanges. A taxpayer may engineer his transac89. Id. at 699.
90. Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968).
91. Id. at 654. Instead of treating both transactions separately for tax purposes,
the court treated them as like-kind exchanges, relying on Section 1031(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code, which states as follows: "Inlo gain or loss shall be recognized
if property held for productive use in trade or business or for investment is exchanged
solely for property of a like kind to be held either for productive use in trade or
business or for investment." Id. at n.1.
92. Id. at 658.
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tions to minimize taxes, but he cannot make a transaction
appear to be what it is not. Documents record transactions,
but they do not always become the sole criteria for transactional analysis. 3
(iii)

Transactions Re-characterized as Part Gift and Part
Sale

Courts have also addressed the tax implications involving
conditional gifts, applying, in many situations, the substanceover-form doctrine to treat conditional gifts as part gift and part
sale. In Diedrich v. Commissioner,94 the parents, the taxpayers,
made a gift of stock with a basis of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)
and fair market value of three hundred thousand dollars
($300,000) to their children on condition that the children
assumed the parent's obligation to pay sixty thousand dollars
($60,000) of federal gift tax. The tax authorities recast this transaction treating it as part gift and part sale. Relying on the substance-over-form doctrine, the United States Supreme Court
decided in favor of the government. According to the Court, the
assumption of the parent's liability by the children led to an economic benefit to the parents similar to the receipt of cash. Furthermore, the Court noted:
Consistent with the economic reality, the Commissioner
has treated these conditional gifts as a discharge of indebtedness through a part gift and part sale of the gift property
transferred. The transfer is treated as if the donor sells the
property to the donee for less than the fair market value.
The "sale" price is the amount necessary to discharge the
gift tax indebtedness; the balance of the value of the transferred property is treated as a gift. The gain thus derived
by the donor is the amount of the gift tax liability less the
donor's adjusted basis in the entire property. Accordingly,
income is realized to the extent that the gift tax exceeds the
donor's adjusted basis in the property. This treatment is
consistent with § 1001 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
provides that the gain from the disposition of property is
the excess of the amount realized over the transferor's
adjusted basis in the property.95
93. Id. at 659.
94. Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191 (1982).
95. Id. at 198-99.
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(iv) Who is entitled to take depreciation deductions?
Courts already have addressed the application of the substance-over-form doctrine with respect to depreciation deduction
for corporate tax purposes. Even though someone holds legal title
of certain real property, he only will be allowed to take depreciation deductions for the real property if he is considered the owner
in substance of the building.
In Helvering v. Lazarus, the taxpayer, Mr. Lazarus, transferred the legal title of three buildings, which he had used as a
department store, to a trustee. The trustee immediately leased
back the properties to Mr. Lazarus for ninety-nine years with an
option to renew the leases and repurchase the properties.9 6 The
taxpayer claimed depreciation deductions, but the tax authorities
denied such deductions, arguing basically that the right to a
depreciation deduction follows legal title. The United States
Supreme Court held in favor of the taxpayer on the ground that
the taxpayer, who had used the buildings for their entire useful
life, was the real owner of the properties for tax purposes.
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States is another Supreme Court
case in which the substance-over-form doctrine was examined by
the Court for the purpose of depreciation deductions. 7 This case
involved Frank Lyon Company (the taxpayer), Worthen Bank &
Trust Company (a state bank), and New York Life Insurance
Company (the lender). The state bank spent $10 million dollars
for the construction of its new headquarters building, but the Federal Reserve System, to whose supervision the bank was subject,
did not permit such an expenditure to construct new premises on
the ground that $10 million dollars was in excess of the bank's
capital stock, disallowing, therefore, the bank to continue owning
the building. However, for the bank to continue using the building, but without legally owning it, the Federal Reserve System
allowed the following transaction entered among the parties: The
taxpayer purchased the building from the bank, paying $500,000
dollars as down payment, and financed the remaining through a
25-year mortgage loan from the lender. Subsequently, the taxpayer leased the building back to the seller for twenty-five years,
giving the seller an option to repurchase the building at specific
times and prices during the eleventh through twenty-fifth years of
the lease. It is worth noting that the lease arrangement entered
96. Helvering v. Lazarus, 308 U.S. 252, 253 (1939).
97. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
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into between the parties was a net lease, meaning that the lessee
was responsible for all expenses of the building, such as insurance, taxes, maintenance, etc. Moreover, the monthly rent payable by the bank to the taxpayer was similar to the mortgage
payment owed by the taxpayer to the lender.
The issue under consideration was the fact that the taxpayer,
who was the holder of the legal title of the building, took depreciation deductions for the building, but the tax authorities, relying on
Helvering,8 denied such deductions on the ground that in substance, the taxpayer was not the owner of the building. Focusing
on the fact that the taxpayer was liable on the mortgage, as well
as the fact that the Federal Reserve System did not permit the
bank to borrow directly from the lender, the United States
Supreme Court decided in favor of the taxpayer, allowing the
depreciation deductions for the building.
It should be noted, however, that the rationale of this case
was completely different from the rationale of Helvering. While in
Helvering the court held that the lessor was not the real owner of
the real property for tax purposes, the court held in Frank Lyon
that the lessor, under the same circumstances, was the real owner
of the real property for tax purposes. The FrankLyon Court drew
a distinction between these two cases, relying on the fact that
while Helvering involved a two-party transaction in which "[tihe
Court looked closely at the substance of the agreement between
those two parties and rightly concluded that depreciation was
deductible by the taxpayer despite the nomenclature of the instrument of conveyance and the leaseback,"99 Frank Lyon involved a
three-party transaction where a two-party transaction was not
permissible because of the restrictions imposed by the Federal
Reserve System upon the bank. Furthermore, the taxpayer in
Frank Lyon was primarily liable for the mortgage, retaining substantial economic risks associated with the buildings. Therefore,
the taxpayer was entitled to take depreciation deductions.
Upon describing the transactions above, as well as the outcome of the cases, it is important to note the role of the substanceover-form doctrine with respect to depreciation deductions. More
importantly, sometimes courts are reluctant to accept the idea
that the holder of the legal title of a piece of property is necessarily
entitled to claim depreciation deductions.0 0
98. Id. at 574-75.
99. Id. at 575.

100. See Swift Dodge v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 651, 654 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding
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The substance-over-form doctrine in Brazil: The
statutory law

On January 10, 2001, the Brazilian Congress enacted Complementary Law No. 104, including a sole paragraph to Article
116 of the Brazilian Tax Code, which reads: "Itihe administrative
authority may disregard legal acts or business activities performed with the objective of dissimulating the occurrence of a taxable event, or the nature of the elements that constitutes the tax
obligation, following the procedures to be prescribed by ordinary
10
laws." 1
The enactment of Complementary Law No. 104 has led to several debates among tax practitioners, commentators, courts, and
even members of the Secretariada Receita Federal. The center of
such debates is the adoption of the substance-over-form doctrine
in the Brazilian tax system, in which tax authorities may disregard transactions structured by taxpayers in such a manner of
reducing their tax liability, lacking, moreover, any evidence of
business or economic purposes.
Many commentators have pointed out that there are three
ways to interpret the scope of application of this new tax statute.
First, Complementary Law No. 104 has not created any new institute into the Brazilian tax system, since it is exclusively applied to
behaviors involving tax evasion. Because the law uses the verb
"to dissimulate", which means to defraud, to simulate, or to hide,
it will only be applied to circumstances that denote fraud or simulation. However, both fraudulent and simulated behaviors
already were punishable by the Brazilian legal system before the
enactment of this tax statute. °2 Second, Complementary Law No.
104 has imposed limits on tax planning, permitting tax authorities to disregard the form of certain transactions when they are
structured to avoid taxes. Under this proposition, commentators
have argued that Complementary Law No. 104 is unconstitutional
because the right of the taxpayer to arrange his affairs to incur
the least tax liability is assured by the principle of legality set
that the holder of legal title of the property will only be able to take depreciation
deductions if he retains significant economic risks associated with the building).
101. Lei Complementar [Complementary Law] No. 104, de 10 de janeiro de 2001,
D.O.U. de 11.01.2001.
102. Ricardo Mariz de Oliveira, A Elisdo Fiscal ante a Lei Complementar no. 104
[Tax Avoidance before Complementary Law No. 104], in 0 PLANEJAMENTO TRIBUTARIO
E A LEI COMPLEMENTAR 104, [Tax Planning and Complementary Law 1041 247-304
(Dialdtica, 2001).

BRAZIL'S TAX SYSTEM

2004]

forth in the Brazilian constitutional system." 3 Third, Complementary Law No. 104 has definitely incorporated the substanceover-form doctrine into the Brazilian tax system and such incorporation is totally permissible. In other words, the Brazilian sub4
stance-over-form doctrine is constitutional.11
Pursuant to Complementary Law No. 104, tax authorities
only may disregard legal acts or business activities, or apply the
substance-over-form doctrine after the enactment of an ordinary
law."0 ' More importantly, the former Brazilian president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, tried to give practical effect to Complementary Law No. 104, passing Provisional Measure No. 66, which,
among other things, limited the liberty of the taxpayers to reduce
their tax liability. 10 6 However, the Brazilian Congress refused to
convert the provisions concerning limitations on tax planning of
Provisional Measure No. 66 into an ordinary law.0 7 This act of the
Brazilian Congress clearly suggests that Provisional Measure No.
66 is totally unconstitutional, and, as a corollary of that, Complementary Law No. 104 also is incompatible with the Brazilian tax
8
system.

0

It should be noted that before the enactment of Complemen103. Ives Gandra da Silva Martins, Norma Antielisdo 6 Incompativel corn o Sistema
Constitucional Brasileiro [Non-Tax Avoidance Law is not Compatible with the
Brazilian Constitutional System], in 0 PLANEJAMENTO TRIBUTARIO E A LEI
COMPLEMENTAR 104, [Tax Planning and Complementary Law 104] 119-28 (Dial~tica,
2001).
104. Jofo DAcio Rolim, Consideraqdessobre a Norma GeralAntielisiva Introduzida
pela Lei Complementar 104/2001, [Notes on the Non-Tax Avoidance Law created by
Complementary Law 104/2001] in 0 PLANEJAMENTO TRIBUTARIO E A LEI
COMPLEMENTAR 104, [Tax Planning and Complementary Law 104] 131-43 (Dialdtica,
2001).
105. According to Complementary Law No. 104/2001 the disregard of legal acts or
business activities by the tax authorities must follow certain procedures to be
prescribed by ordinary laws.
106. Medida Provis6ria [Provisional Measure] No. 66, de 29 de agosto de 2002,
D.O.U. de 30.08.2002, arts. 13-19. It is worth noting that, according to Article 62 of
the Brazilian Constitution, the Brazilian President, in certain limited circumstances,
has the power of adopting provisional measures that have the force of ordinary laws
provided that such provisional measures are converted into ordinary laws by
Congress within a period of sixty days extended to another period of sixty days.
107. Although Provisional Measure was in fact converted into an ordinary law (Lei
No. 10.637, de 30 de dezembro de 2002, D.O.U. de 31.12.2002), the provisions dealing
with the application of the substance-over-form doctrine were rejected by Congress.
108. It is worth noting that as soon as Congress passed Complementary Law No.
104 the National Confederation of Commerce brought a suit before the Brazilian
Supreme Court (ADIN No. 2446) seeking the declaration of unconstitutionality of
Complementary Law No. 104. However, such a lawsuit is still pending of a court
decision.
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tary Law No. 104/2001, Brazilian tax authorities had attempted to
ignore the form of certain transactions for tax purposes. Nevertheless, such an effort did not prevail. For example, the Administrative Court of Appeals has ruled that the Brazilian tax system
does not permit the recast of a transaction structured in such a
manner to reduce the income tax liability provided that the taxpayer has acted in accordance with the principle of legality." 9
Accordingly, if the taxpayer performs an activity that is not a taxable event, he cannot be compelled to pay income tax as a consequence of such activity.
C. A hypothetical example that contrasts both
substance-over-form doctrines
A single example is sufficient to demonstrate that the American common law system allows the broad application of the substance-over-form doctrine, while the Brazilian civil law system,
particularly due to the structure of the constitutional tax system,
does not permit the invocation of such a doctrine for tax avoidance
purposes. With respect to the American tax system, as suggested
by some commentators:
The substance-over-form doctrine can be successfully
invoked in order to treat a purported lease of business
equipment with an option in the lessee to purchase the
property as a sale on credit if the option price is nominal in
amount or the term of the lease is coextensive with the
property's anticipated economic life.10
This same fact pattern has already been confronted by Brazilian
courts. In many circumstances the Brazilian government has
tried to recast a leasing arrangement as an installment sale, denying the deduction of the monthly payments made by the lessee for
corporate tax purposes. It usually occurs when the pre-arranged
fixed amount to be paid by the lessee at the end of the leasing
agreement is nominal. However, the Superior Court of Justice,
Brazil's second highest court, has refused to accept the government's position on the ground that the existing statutory law does
not establish a minimum requirement for the amount of the prearranged fixed payment."' Therefore, the parties are free to nego109. See Primeiro Conselho de Contribuintes [First Taxpayer's Council], Ac6rdao
No. 106-09343, Relator: Conselheiro Gen~sio Deschamps, 18.09.1997.
110. BITTKER & LOKKEN , supra note 77, at S4-9.
111. See Superior Tribunal de Justi~a [Superior Court of Justice], STJ, RESP No.
465428, Relator: Ministro Jos6 Delgado, 6.02.2003, D.J.U. 24.03.2003.
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tiate the amount of such payment.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although both Brazil and the United States have developed a
mechanism against tax avoidance, or the substance-over-form doctrine, such development clearly was influenced by the characteristics of the legal tradition of each country. Therefore, there is a
substantial difference concerning the circumstances in which the
substance-over-form doctrines developed by both countries may
come into play.
Due to the differences of both legal traditions, the circumstances in which the taxpayer has the right of arranging his
affairs to pay less tax is much more accepted in the Brazilian legal
system than in the U.S. legal system. In addition, while the U.S.
tax authorities may successfully invoke the substance-over-form
doctrine to disregard the form of a transaction structured by the
taxpayer with the sole purpose of tax avoidance, the Brazilian tax
authorities may only invoke this doctrine when the taxpayer
evades taxes by means of fraudulent or simulated behavior.
In the United States, the substance-over-form doctrine is
essentially a judicial doctrine since it has developed by case law,
capable of being successfully applied to any kind of transaction
lacking economic purpose or entered into with the sole aim at
avoiding taxes. The substance-over-form doctrine in Brazil is a
legislative doctrine, created by Congress with the promulgation of
Complementary Law No. 104. Nonetheless, the Brazilian substance-over-form doctrine has no practical effect since the ordinary law required by Complementary Law No. 104 has not been
passed. Assuming that the ordinary law required by Complementary Law No. 104 is promulgated by Congress, it most likely will
be challenged in courts since a mechanism for restricting tax
avoidance, like the mechanism currently in force in the United
States, is incompatible with the civil law tradition of the Brazilian
tax system. The Brazilian civil law tradition, strongly relying on
the principle of legality, permits any taxpayer to take all necessary steps permitted by law to reduce his tax liability provided
that the tax event has not occurred yet.

